

Artículo de investigación

Realization of phenomenological life-world in the presence of subject and its intersubjective relation

Realización del mundo vital fenomenológico en presencia del sujeto y su relación intersubjetiva

Realização do mundo da vida fenomenológico na presença do sujeito e sua relação intersubjetiva

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Abstract

Transcendental consciousness is the principle of principles based on which philosophization of great philosophers such as Descartes and Husserl has been founded. With an inquiry into the intentional structure of this transcendental consciousness, Husserl accepts it just like the fundamental principle of philosophization and calls himself another New Cartesian. Descartes' first principle is the thinking ego which, according to Husserl, has noemata in its thought. It should be noted that the fundamental element of his philosophization, i.e. "transcendental ego", is the same thing in an intersubjective relation to which all matters, including life-world and everything therein, are constituted. It is the same thing that happens with deep mining of the thoughts in the mind of the thinking ego and lived experience of consciousness fluid life. From the joining of monad-like egos, the first form of objectivity, i.e. intersubjective nature, arises. Here, my perception of the other and world and even other ego's perception of me and my world are seen in the same way by identical necessity; that is, everyone in his own position considers another ego in its own position to be similar to himself. This means that their life-world is easily exchanged with each other. Ego as the transcendental and concrete ego experiences and knows other egos inside itself with certainty and hence, my life-world will be identical with his. Overall, Husserl was influenced by Descartes in presenting his own philosophical views. So, this

Resumen

La conciencia trascendental es el principio de principios basado en el cual se ha fundado la filosofía de grandes filósofos como Descartes y Husserl. Con una investigación sobre la estructura intencional de esta conciencia trascendental, Husserl la acepta como el principio fundamental de la filosofización y se llama a sí mismo otro Nuevo cartesiano. El primer principio de Descartes es el yo pensante que, según Husserl, tiene noemata en su pensamiento. Debe notarse que el elemento fundamental de su filosofización, es decir, el "ego trascendental", es lo mismo en una relación intersubjetiva a la que están constituidas todas las materias, incluido el mundo de la vida y todo lo que está en ellas. Es lo mismo que sucede con la minería profunda de los pensamientos en la mente del ego pensante y la experiencia vivida de la vida fluida de la conciencia. A partir de la unión de egos de tipo mónada, surge la primera forma de objetividad, es decir, la naturaleza intersubjetiva. Aquí, mi percepción del otro y del mundo e incluso la percepción del otro ego sobre mí y mi mundo se ven de la misma manera por idéntica necesidad; es decir, todos en su propia posición consideran que otro ego en su propia posición es similar a él. Esto significa que su mundo de la vida se intercambia fácilmente entre sí. El ego como el ego trascendental y concreto experimenta y conoce otros egos en su interior con certeza y, por lo tanto, mi mundo de vida será idéntico al suyo. En general, Husserl fue

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paper aims to investigate and analyze Cartesian meditations in his philosophical approaches. The research method is descriptive-analytical.

Keyword: Transcendental ego, subjectivity, intersubjective relation, other ego, life-world.

influenciado por Descartes al presentar sus propios puntos de vista filosóficos. Por lo tanto, este artículo tiene como objetivo investigar y analizar las meditaciones cartesianas en sus enfoques filosóficos. El método de investigación es descriptivo-analítico.

Palabra clave: ego trascendental, subjetividad, relación intersubjetiva, otro ego, mundo de la vida.

Resumo

A consciência transcendental é o princípio de princípios baseado no qual a filosofização de grandes filósofos como Descartes e Husserl foi fundada. Com uma investigação sobre a estrutura intencional dessa consciência transcendental, Husserl a aceita exatamente como o princípio fundamental da filosofização e chama a si mesmo de outro novo cartesiano. O primeiro princípio de Descartes é o ego pensante que, segundo Husserl, tem noemata em seu pensamento. Deve-se notar que o elemento fundamental de sua filosofização, ou seja, "ego transcendental", é a mesma coisa em uma relação intersubjetiva à qual todas as matérias, incluindo o mundo da vida e tudo o que nele existe, são constituídas. É a mesma coisa que acontece com a mineração profunda dos pensamentos na mente do ego pensante e na experiência vivida da vida fluida da consciência. A partir da união de egos semelhantes a mônadas, surge a primeira forma de objetividade, ou seja, a natureza intersubjetiva. Aqui, minha percepção do outro e a percepção do mundo e até mesmo do ego de mim e do meu mundo são vistas da mesma maneira por necessidade idêntica; isto é, todos em sua própria posição consideram que outro ego em sua própria posição é semelhante a ele mesmo. Isso significa que seu mundo da vida é facilmente trocado entre si. O ego como o ego transcendental e concreto experimenta e conhece outros egos dentro de si com certeza e, portanto, meu mundo da vida será idêntico ao dele. No geral, Husserl foi influenciado por Descartes ao apresentar seus próprios pontos de vista filosóficos. Assim, este artigo tem como objetivo investigar e analisar as meditações cartesianas em suas abordagens filosóficas. O método de pesquisa é descritivo-analítico.

Palavra-chave: ego transcendental, subjetividade, relação intersubjetiva, outro ego, mundo da vida.

Introduction

The main issue in phenomenology and principally in all philosophy is the search for the foundation and the original principle based on which certainty can be achieved. Descartes' first principle is the thinking ego which, according to Husserl, has noemata in its thought. The central point of primary humanism can be regarded as the existence of a sustainable and coherent self that benefits from freedom of will and relative supremacy over the outside world. In this view, the whole human existence is summarized in consciousness and Descartes proclaims "I think, so I am". From now on, understanding and study of ego becomes the fundamental goal of Western philosophy so that Husserl considers philosophy as equivalent to egology. What we find along with the fundamental role of "ego" in phenomenological thinking is that everything that needs existence is entitled so only in the mind of the transcendental ego. Therefore, opening new horizons of existence is conceivable while discovering such a transcendental ego. Husserl

seeks to reach immortal logos and a new beginning by disregarding loose philosophical foundations; something that, in his view, happens in the fluid domain of consciousness. It should be remembered that the fundamental element of his philosophization, i.e. transcendental ego, is the same thing that constitutes in the realm of its mind all matters, including life-world and everything therein, in an intersubjective relation. Husserl was convinced that the subject is in the center of philosophy. Consequently, philosophy is nothing but the understanding of ego. This Cartesian characteristic has turned Husserl into one of the greatest figures of modern thought. In the modern age and its emerged philosophies, man is a thoughtful creature resulting from the Cartesian term "I think, so I am" (Cogito).

Husserl attempts to introduce human intellect as a criterion for searching the fundamental philosophical truth. In his thinking, the main issue is consciousness and his purpose

is to equip man with a means to accurately understand the world of life. An emphasis on the phenomenological transcendental domain of self is due to its relation to consciousness. Consciousness is applied not only in the physical reality of the world of self but also for every reasonable world. In his own phenomenology, Husserl considers the entire world to belong to consciousness with its infinite form of time and place. This ego initially exists in a natural approach and is then placed in a transcendental approach by reflecting on self. In the Husserlian phenomenology, Greek Arche is considered the same as ego which tries to recognize other matters in self. From a phenomenological point of view, the transcendental ego is a prerequisite for any perception so that this ego is regarded as the precondition for the existence of this universe (objective nature). In such a position, a single and isolated ego cannot alone seek to conquer the world, but the assumption is a universe and life-world that results from the union of ego and other egos and in this way, we witness a common universe and life-world. By discovering this life-world, the realm of subjective phenomena which has remained unknown can be disclosed. In this phenomenology and thanks to the discovery of concrete life-worlds, we will be able to consider phenomenology and philosophy as a basic science. In the field of mind and for ego, the natural world is discovered as an object. This ego can be a life-world for all similar egos, and all transcendental egos (transcendental we) can live there with peace. In this way, from each "other ego", we reach another "other ego" such that "other ego" fills the gap and vacuum of the lonely ego and the intersubjective flow is formed in the meantime. The perception of this intersubjective relation is through a number of actions of which the person is aware. Thus, intersubjective relation becomes the fundamental dimension of human experiences. Among the issues following the intersubjective relation is the topic of "life-world" since the congregation of monads and intersubjective relation does not occur in a vacuum but in the life-world. So, for the most primary intentional states to another creature, life-world is required because if ego wants to pay attention to other creatures, it needs a common environment between them. Husserl observes that the condition for the existence of intersubjective relation is the presence of a common life-world. Life-world always correlates with the perception of harmonious experience of intersubjective intentionality. Life-world is the area in which we live; a world that has physical,

political, mythological and moral characteristics and dimensions. Based on the foregoing, it seems that Husserl has obviously been influenced by René Descartes' thoughts in describing and outlining his views. Therefore, the aim of this study is to answer the question as to what the most important Cartesian meditations in Husserl's philosophical thought are. The research method is comparative-analytical. Although a great deal of research has been conducted on Husserl's philosophy, an independent study that has expounded Husserl's influence from Descartes was not observed. This adds to the innovative aspect of the present research.

Transcendental ego (subject)

If we look for truth in Husserlian thinking, that truth cannot be found elsewhere except in ourselves. Thus, truth and criterion for truth is nothing but the transcendental ego which the profitability of every other thing even the world lies in its conscious life. Thus, ego is always raised as the identical pole of lived matters of self. This indicates the eternal correlation of cogito and objects of its thought; the cogito that, like Monad Leibniz, engages in constituting self and affairs, with the difference that these monads are open to the world and constitute the affairs in the intersubjective relation and life-world. Transcendental and monad-like ego reveals, opens and constitutes its horizons and realms in its eidetic scope after the transcendental reduction. So, phenomenology will not be anything except "clarifying the general essence of transcendental ego" (Husserl, 2002: 122). As a result, everything that is valid for human ego has validity and reliability inside the conscious life of ego and this ego does not go out of self in its awareness of the world and in all its scientific activities. "Any proof and any justification of the truth and existence are totally done in ego and the result is an attribute in the object of the ego's I think" (ibid.: 135). Husserl comes to the conclusion that there is always a thought about something and the consciousness that has tendency towards a direction; this is intentionality. With this assumption, Husserl's theory of intentionality can be assumed as an attempt to solve the problem of our knowledge of the external world through proving how mental acts can turn into physical objects and natural states of affairs (Smith & McIntyre, 1982: 87).

The semantic essence of action is its intentional essence. However, it seems that the





theory of intentionality is intended to explain how a mental action can possess an intentional attribute (or a tendency to the object). This theory is completely general since it is applied to every intentional action of any kind. Therefore, "having a tendency to the object" is the inherent attribute of actions and this relation is a significant intentional relationship. "How the intentional essence of the intuitive action matches or goes to the semantic essence of the significant action?" (Husserl, 2002b: 719).

Merleau-Ponty also seeks to prove that externality of the world as a matter isolated from the conscious ego does not exist. Hence, the Cartesian duality problem and Kantian thing-in-itself are dissolved in Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and these are due to the intentionality of the transcendental ego. From the description by Merleau-Ponty about Husserl's phenomenology, it can be concluded that:

"Late in Husserl's life, phenomenon gradually assumes an ontological role like openness of the world to transcendental consciousness so that this world is common for all and is an integrated unit in which the perspectives of all people blend together. For this reason, Husserl's phenomenology is transcendental idealism" (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: XXI).

Reduction of a theory is not a claim but is an action to be done and, in its pure form, is not an indicative sentence but is an imperative sentence. Talking about transcendental reduction or phenomenology in a singular tense is a little misleading because Husserl often speaks as if they are more than one. For example, in *Ideas*, Husserl distinguishes between philosophical reductions and natural, subjective, logical and material sciences such as geometry (Husserl, 1970a: 150). For Husserl, transcendental reduction is the same as "placing in parentheses" and, as mentioned in *Ideas*, this means that "although what exists in self remains, we "disable" it, "lay it aside" and "put it in parentheses". It is still there because there is a matter within a pair of parentheses... but we do not apply it (ibid, 2002b: 111). In this way, "ego obtains something that is its own pure life with all pure subjective processes constituting it along with whatever exists purely as they are intended; that is, the world of phenomena" (Ibid, 1982: 20). What remains with the phenomenological reduction is the transcendental ego; that is, the Greek principle and fundamental element of

philosophy; the transcendental ego that is constantly grappling with its objects; the ego that has always aimed at its own objects. The main attribute of the Husserlian phenomena is the intentionality that is constituted in a noetic (application of thought)-noematic (what is thought in the application of thought) correlation. In this way, consciousness which is always aware of something includes consciousness carrying Ego Cogito Cogitatum (I think an object). Husserl states that if we have a conception of Jupiter, this God is the object of my imagination. He is present in my act in an immanent way and has subjectivity in that existence. I think of Jupiter as I think of Bismarck. I think of the Babylon tower as I think the Cologne church (ibid., 2002b: 558-560).

One can summarize all Husserl's phenomenology to this two-sided correlation through a general approach; a relationship that only occurs in the mind. Thus, seeing something like a tree is not just for its external reality but is because it has been intended in the conscience. Any consciousness is always consciousness about something and each thought has always aimed at its noemata. In eidetic intuition, we meet directly with the objects; that is, the noumenon which could not be achieved within the limits of the Kantian theoretical intellect since the field of cognition for Kant was just phenomenon. Consequently, in Husserl's opinion, "what provides the final basis is the essential insight not experience" (ibid., 2002a: 62). Reduction does not mean the sophistication of the world or real doubt about the world, but it merely means the refusal to make any prejudgment. With such reduction about the existence of the natural world, Husserl takes the most important phenomenological step. He says: "The phenomenological reduction is an act that absolutely prevents me from any judgment about time-space existence" (ibid., 1982: 55). Then, he mentions that:

"I briefly say that a much shorter way to transcendental reduction in ideas, which I call Cartesian way, has a big flaw. While it reaches the transcendental ego with a leap, it manifests this ego as something apparently empty of content" (ibid., 1970a: 155).

Although Descartes has made no mention of the field of consciousness after the discovery of "I think, so I am", it can practically be said that even with a phenomenological approach, he has reached this ego and all other things that are

proved, such as God and the essential difference between the soul and the body, are the affairs occurring in the field of consciousness. From the Cartesian perspective, thought has all levels of conscience, like imagination, doubt, remembrance and idea, within it. Husserl argues that the main problem of modern philosophy is the opposition of the world between the subject and object. In his view, it should be noted in the first step that instead of "I think", Descartes should say "Ego Cogito Cogitatum" (I think an object); I am a thinker who thinks about noemata. After discovering the intentional consciousness, Husserl attempted to transit from an assertoric to apodictic evidence. In this apodictic evidence, we find out that the whole world has been reduced to the consciousness of the ego and it is us who have acquired the world as a phenomenon for ourselves. Husserl seeks to link consciousness and the world. In this way, the world is our world and this is us who are the condition for the emergence of the world; a world that we find in our self by intuition; a world that remains with us after reduction (epoche).

As mentioned by Merleau-Ponty (1995), phenomenology states that consciousness is an intermediary and its mediation which is done with the aid of its intentionality completely changes the issue of duality and our common understanding of perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1995: 160).

In his book called "Empirical Psychology", Brentano (1874) believed that all psychological actions act directionally: "The feature of every subjective phenomenon can be called the reference to the content or orientation toward the object or immanent objectivity" (Brentano, 1995: 88). This is a stage that is not merely perception for Husserl, but "perception is perception". Hence, Husserl seeks to remove the gap between subject and object, which seemed impossible before him.

Husserl observes that the realm of transcendental consciousness in a completely definite sense is the realm of "absolute" existence. This main category of existence is in the same way... in which the root of all other realms of existence has been put (Husserl, 2002a: 212). Nevertheless, one of the results of Husserl's orientation was the displacement of epistemological and ontological theories. This displacement became possible only by transcendental reduction. "So, phenomenological reductions seek to split

themselves" (Ibid, 1985: 15) and from this split, "an ego is obtained because the observer impartial to the objects of his intentional self is not naïve" (Ibid, 1982: 35); the ego that is the absolute world of self-knowledge. This ego is a transcendental and absolute ego that is the suitable subject of phenomenological study and not a natural ego that is the subject of empirical knowledge of psychology. "If the transcendental object is the world of possible meanings, then outside it is absolutely meaningless" (ibid: 84). However, we are faced with a world that is placed in the concrete content of subjective life and in the flood of the mind. This world is not a natural world to which we gain access in a natural approach but is a transcendental world in the consciousness of the transcendental ego.

This world has been enacted as a real and transcendental existence by ego. Jean-François Lyotard believes that any object for the consciousness of ego is nothing but something passive (object) for the consciousness of ego. Husserl uses the term "object" in the widest possible sense; a sense in which everything is object, whether it is an action or a state of affairs or an attribute or a material issue or a moment. Further, Husserl makes another distinction between physical and mental objects. He has inherited this distinction from Brentano with the least modification. Object is everything with intentional content, and object meaning a physical phenomenon is simpler than mental object (ibid., 2002b: 868). Subjective action is always an intentional phenomenon (Ibid: 556). In the meantime, a distinction should be made between meaning and meaningful action or between meaning intention and meaning fulfillment.

For Husserl, the meaning of objects appears not as an abstract thing but as concrete consciousness and thus, a form of these objects comes to us that appears in our mind. Husserl considers these objects as eidetic not external and physical objects. He believes that we are associated with the objects that are present before us concretely. Objectivity is always for the subject. He considers all objects to be really object as far as they are object for the subject and anything other than this (apart from the conscious subject) is meaningless (Smith, 2003: 33). Everything finds meaning in the light of conscious ego and not only the material nature but also the concrete life-world around us is a phenomenon for ego (ibid: 36). Husserl no longer needs to assume the self as an immaterial





essence and thought for proving the world. Perhaps, the main purpose of reduction is to merely remind man of the relationship between his conscience and the discovery of noemata that come in conscience. In a sense, we are more than what we are. The world is the amount that is correlated to our existence. As a result, we are responsible for the world and the world becomes dependent on the objects that we have selected for ourselves. So, things and affairs of the world will never be known to us *per se* unless they become the object of our conscience. Husserl's transcendental idealism passes through this phenomenology since in phenomenological reduction, the first and last words are given by meaning. With this authenticity of meaning, a new realm of existing is opened to us which includes intentional existence; that is, it is me who can understand the world in my favor. The meaning of all kinds of eidos (material, formal, concrete and abstract) is formed in the light of transcendental ego since it is me who understands the eidos by intuition. Intuition is the same as the fulfillment of intention, i.e. leading to a type of intention correlated with intuition. The whole world is understood at the time of coincidence of this correlation. Hence, for its intuition, we need a departure for the world of meaning; a departure whose aim is to meet the eidos of affairs. Therefore, the veils should be removed so that according to Heidegger, the truth also comes to us. Truth in the world of phenomenon is found in the concrete world of transcendental ego. Thus, there is no longer a need for ascension to another world. Phenomenology never confines itself to fixed facts but is always like a new start for fresh and fresher discoveries.

Intersubjective relation

Husserl is looking for a kind of consciousness as an inner experience. However, Husserl's inner experience of consciousness is not a psychological issue but is a phenomenological and philosophical issue. So, he is in search of a rational and not objective and natural phenomenon (Moran & Mooney, 2002: 78). In this field, we deal with a dual intention between consciousness and its objects which are subjective correlations; that is, everything conceived in our mind is important. We will always see the intention of this dual correspondence in practice, meaning that we are faced with a mind with a fluid life, i.e. with a phenomenological, antecedent and essential form. For Husserl, such a correlational

relationship between object and subject is an immanent relation, meaning these two correlate to the existence of each other. Hence, the object of consciousness is a matter that is dissolved in the mind of the transcendental immanent ego and consequently, we never face noemata like objective and actual objects since the flow inside us is always immanent which occurs in the mind of the thinking ego (ibid: 138-139). What is formed in the light of this relation is indeed the transition to a superior form of consciousness. In this way, we enter a subjective and concrete flow of consciousness and through these relationships, we can hope to reach an eidetic intuition. Ego as a thinking being is faced with a group of noemata which are inseparable part of ego. Besides, after these affairs became known to ego, a distinct understanding of other ego is achieved, which is caused by the real expansion of the concept of internal experience of ego. I find others in the intersubjective realm and pure life of my consciousness. This is a process in which one can hope the achievement of eidetic science. The first individual who could make a transcendental turn in this meaning was Descartes as the purpose of his meditations was to achieve the first philosophy, which is the same thing that Husserl was looking for. But Husserl analyzed this Cartesian transcendental turn through phenomenological and transcendental reduction in order to pass the duality created for Descartes because Husserl's self is no longer a thinking and lonely essence but is a psychosomatic ego.

Husserl believes that fact and essence cannot be separated since the concept of phenomenon in its broad area embraces all of them in a united meaning. From Husserl's view, essence and eidos of all affairs is thought. It is due to this thought that we can understand the eidetic intuition of affairs in their pure state like phenomenology in itself. For Husserl, achievement of the existence of a concrete eidos is important (Husserl, 2002a: 52-60). This ego as an ego-subject recognizes the core of the natural world as the subjective object. From the view of this ego, life-world is considered in an intersubjective relation for all egos similar to this ego such that all transcendental egos (transcendental we) live in it with peace (ibid: 103-119). All of these objects even external objects are in a subjective relation to the transcendental ego. Thus, subject and objects find meaning in a correlational unity with each other. Ego is like a communication center for all lived matters in the consciousness of ego and all

lived matters find meaning in relation to this transcendental ego. Transcendental ego is not an object but a correlation for objects, which encompasses all of them in its transcendental scope. As a result, everything outside this relation is meaningless (ibid, 2002b: 83-92). Husserl's growing interest in constituting affairs due to the cooperation of intersubjective relation and fundamental reduction of things is an issue that cannot be ignored. In his viewpoint, transcendental reduction ultimately brings us to transcendental-intersubjective phenomenology (Husserliana LXP, 2002: 245). This relation is a point of departure towards opening new horizons of experiences of consciousness. In this way, the opening of new horizons occurs in the light of the relation between ego and other ego in an intersubjective world; an issue whose realization is in a concrete and antecedent structure. In Husserl's analysis of the intentional structure, experience becomes evident. Intentionality plays a crucial role in opening new horizons of thinking since in every moment, with the realization of intentionality, a new horizon can be witnessed. This means that a new object is added to consciousness (Dan, 1997: 1). Husserl sees the characteristic of each horizon to be its potential talent in possible perceptions and correlation of ego, i.e. opting an absent feature that is in correlation with the perceptions of ego (ibid: 2). It is understood from analyzing the nature of the horizon that this is completely dependent on multiple intentional perceptions of subjects and in this way provides us with multiple possibilities as Husserl also refers to the term "open intersubjectivity" (ibid: 3). This mutual relationship between subjects is possible only in the world and through unanimity, i.e. when every "other ego" and its body are viewed as ego (subject) and its body. Here, I (conscious subject) perceive the relation between the self and the world through self-consciousness and with the help of unanimity and consider other ego like ego, i.e. a subject that makes the world its object (Smith, 2003: 243).

According to Husserl, objects of the world can be revealed through the eidetic feature of phenomenology; that is, eidos can be observed and in this way, we can witness the possibility of the presence of transcendental-eidetic phenomenology (ibid: 137). In the eidetic order, we deal with a new kind of intuition and object in a higher order. Husserl often states that the possibility of seeing eidos is in the reference to such a free variation (ibid: 138). Husserl tries to transit from the intersubjective relation of

subjects to a transcendental philosophy; a philosophy in which no matters have been isolated but self-consciousness has a social language and intersubjective relation which constitute any reality.

From Husserl's point of view, the simplest way to explain the intersubjective relation is the concept of life-world. In this respect, he has used the term "social entities". In his opinion, all subjects in life-world have a general experience. He explicitly states that:

"The transcendental intersubjective relation is the absolute ground of existence (Seinboden) from which the relation and meaning of everything originate... Development of phenomenology is necessarily a transition from the egologic stage to transcendental-sociological phenomenology" (Dan, 1997: 1).

In this way, Husserl's attention is fully paid to the transcendental intersubjective relation. He claims that objectivity and transcendence of the universe constitute the intersubjective relation and the clarity of this constitution requires the analysis of the transcendental and intersubjective relation, i.e. more concrete study of the experience of consciousness fluid life of subjects. Accordingly, transcendental ego can constitute the world only after the experience of others (ibid: 2).

Life-world

After the meaning of intersubjective relation became clear, the existence of a common world among egos is concurrently explained. This means that when ego finds out something other than body and consciousness, intentional objects and phenomenal device of ego, ego should simultaneously reside in the same environment. Moreover, ego understands that other egos are conscious like ego. So, such a life-world is created from the intentional and intersubjective experiences among such egos. In this way, the life-world is transformed into a world that is raised among the common meanings of a group of egos. After achieving the transcendental ego, Husserl came to the point that it is time for this transcendental subject to go from an individual stage to a collective stage and this is realized in the intersubjective relation, but all of these events occur in a world that is the place of living experience of egos; a world that is nothing but life-world. Therefore, discovery of life-world is a tendency to find the absolute truth. In other words, truth is the presence and evidence in the



living experience of this moment, and renewal exists in the next moments.

Husserl agree with Cartesian lonely ego as far as there is no mention of understanding other ego. But to prove the intersubjective relation and life-world and not to get caught in the close circle of the lonely ego, it seems that he has to acknowledge the presence of the body. Even the first presence of any other phenomenon along with the consciousness of ego becomes the presence of another body. However, this body is not any body but a body that is called "lived body" by Husserl. Human body is a body that is totally conscious and the body movement is full of mind.

Life-world is an experience that is obtained without voluntary thinking and without resorting to classification or conceptualization and usually consists of those things that are considered to be obvious or common (Husserl, 1970b: 9). Phenomenology is basically the study of lived experience or life-world (Van Manen, 1997: 9). Phenomenology in the world is lived by one person not a world or fact that is separate from human (Valle et al., 1989: 55). Now, we are faced with a world that is not my world but "our world" (Husserl, 1970a: 108) and "the transcendental ego is replaced by the transcendental we" (ibid: 172). It can be stated that evolved phenomenology eventually moves from "the lonely transcendental ego to an intersubjective and transcendental relation" (Van Manen, 1997: 9). In other words:

"Life-world is now and always present for us who live in it with wakefulness. It has already existed for us and forms the ground for all theoretical or extra theoretical actions... Living always includes life in a world of certainty. Wakeful life is wakefulness in the world... Each of them is something; "something from" a world of which we are constantly aware as a horizon... Ego constitutes this special eidos (essence) in itself, "others", "objectivity" and generally whatever has existential validity for ego in ego as non-ego" (Husserl, 1970a: 142-143).

In this way, thanks to the relation intersubjectively and transcendently created, we will witness a life-world of humans who constitute the "transcendental we".

Husserl had considered the concept of life-world as a final introduction to the phenomenological transcendental structure. In

the book called "Crisis of European Sciences", he argues that the concept of life has an absolute value; an issue that is realized in spiritual life-world. Further, he regards phenomenology as a universal self-consciousness of human behavior. He demands an ultimate science behind phenomenology; a science that can be the ground for all human achievements in life-world (Carles, 2009: 68-69).

Conclusion

1- Husserl has obtained the first principle and true knowledge in examining the transcendental thinking. Unlike other academic sciences, he does not try to base the foundation of his desired science on the raw material of real and possible affairs or preliminary beliefs and prejudgments.

2- By such meditations, Husserl looks for the initial, fundamental, essential and unquestionable philosophy and an applied method; a method that begins with "I think" as an indubitable principle. In this way, phenomenology deals with antecedent rules, i.e. return to a transcendental subject that embraces the entire world as an object.

3- Transcendental phenomenology is a new science that covers a new ground of experience. With transcendental experiences, abilities and actions create an independent realm of direct experience.

4- Advanced phenomenology which has been organized needs no antecedent science; but ideally, it has all imaginable previous sciences and in fact absolutely creates the philosophy of sciences.

5- Transcendental phenomenology is considered as the first philosophy and the method of all secondary philosophies and finally, it is for a general philosophy in the traditional sense. Hence, this science cannot be dependent on sciences and cannot exist as secondary to them.

6- Husserl introduces phenomenology as a method by the instrumental and applied use of concepts and terms and extends its scope beyond a type of mere epistemology. With these explanations, idealism of transcendental phenomenology is a theory that is considered as a concrete science in specific verifiable areas. Indeed, Husserl displays for us an image the use

of which is possible in all epistemological spheres.

Endnotes

I. Merleau-Ponty is one of the students and listeners of the lesson "Husserl's speeches" in Sorbonne (1929) called Cartesian meditations. He even considers as extremely important the sixth meditation which has not been published.

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Artículo de reflexión

